主题：Disclosed Analyst Corporate Site Visits, Audit Adjustments, and the Quality of Financial Statements

主讲人：Bernard Yeung（杨贤），南方科技大学商学院讲席教授、新加坡国立大学商学院荣誉教授

时间：9月18日（周三）上午10:00-11:30

地点：4-101教室

语言：英文

摘要：

Using DiD regressions, we exploit the impact of mandatory full disclosure of an analyst’s corporate site visit in China. We find robust evidence that full disclosure improves the quality of financial statements via increased audit adjustments. First, after the full disclosure regulation, audit adjustments are significantly greater for firms with analyst site visits in which more forward-looking information and accounting and finance topics are discussed during the visits. The results are also stronger for firms that give more relevant answers to analysts’ questions, with higher asset tangibility, with fewer analyst following, experienced less past informed risk arbitrage, and in cases where auditors have more pressure to avoid audit failures. These results support the idea that detailed public disclosure of site visits on an open-access website can reveal useful information and press auditors to examine company financial records with extra care. Second, the disclosure also raises audit adjustments for firms in the same industry audited by the affected auditor or her peer auditors working in the same audit firm. Finally, after the full disclosure regulations, these affected firms, compared with other firms and conditioned on having audit adjustments, issue higher-quality financial reports – they have less discretionary accruals and a lower likelihood of issuing restatement. It also follows that these firms have lower average analyst forecast errors and dispersion after the issuance of higher-quality financial reports. Overall, the evidence supports the notion that full disclosure of analyst site visits via a public digital platform improves the quality of financial reporting by improving auditing services and, accordingly improves analyst forecasts.